

# MEMORANDUM

State of Alaska  
Department of Law

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| <b>To:</b> Talis J. Colberg<br>Attorney General   | <b>Date:</b> February 2, 2007   |
| <b>Thru:</b> Craig J. Tillery<br>Deputy Attorney General  | <b>File No:</b> 663-06-0103   |
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| <b>From:</b> Michael A. Barnhill<br>Assistant Attorney General<br>Labor and State Affairs Section | <b>Subject:</b> Governor's Power to Remove<br>a University of Alaska Regent |

We have been asked whether the Governor has the power to remove a University of Alaska regent without cause. In our view, the answer is no.

We acknowledge that this question has been posed to different counsel and different conclusions reached. Legislative counsel has concluded in a written opinion that regents serve at the pleasure of the governor and may be removed at any time. University of Alaska counsel has concluded in a verbal opinion that a regent may be removed only through impeachment by the legislature.

For the reasons set forth below, we do not fully agree with the conclusions of either legislative counsel or university counsel. That being said, we do agree with both legislative counsel and university counsel that impeachment is an option that may be pursued in order to remove a regent. But we disagree with university counsel that it is the only option.

The basis for our views is grounded primarily in the constitution and discussions of the framers regarding the University of Alaska during the constitutional convention. We start there.

## **I. Historical Background**

The University of Alaska was created by the territorial legislature in 1935. ch. 49, SLA 1935. The Board of Regents was created at that time as well, with the governor empowered to appoint regents subject to confirmation by a joint session of the legislature. *Id.* at sec. 3. The term of a regent was eight years and a regent was to serve “until their successors are appointed and have qualified.” *Id.* The original statute made no mention

of how a regent should be removed. This law has essentially remained unchanged through today, though the number of regents was increased to eleven in 1975. *See* AS 14.40.120; 14.40.140; AS 14.40.150.

From the University's inception through statehood we are aware of no instance of a governor removing a regent prior to the end of a regent's term. We recognize that it is possible such could have happened, but it would take further historical research to determine this.

The constitutional convention considered the University of Alaska several times during the course of the convention. Before considering these passages, however, it is important to understand that the territory of Alaska had suffered from a fragmented executive branch with several elected officials and multiple governing boards designed to erode the power of the federally appointed governor. A fundamental goal of the convention was to establish a strong governor who was completely in control of the executive branch of government.<sup>1</sup>

During the consideration of the executive branch article, however, concerns were raised regarding the appropriate place for the University of Alaska within the constitutional design for the new government. These concerns were often expressed in terms of the need to insulate education from politics. Alaska Constitutional Convention Proceedings at 2043, 2246. During the discussions of the provisions that ultimately

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<sup>1</sup> Delegate Fischer later wrote, "[Territorial] government was neither responsible nor responsive to the people. As a result, convention delegates were ready to make basic structural changes so the people could hold the governor wholly responsible for the conduct of state administration." V. Fischer, Alaska's Constitutional Convention at 106 (1975).

became sections 25 and 26 of Article III,<sup>2</sup> questions were raised concerning the extent to which these sections governed appointments to the Board of Regents. The chair of the Executive Branch Committee, Victor Rivers, and a member of that Committee, Katherine Nordale, both responded that section 26 of Article III only applied to “principal departments” and that the University of Alaska was not a principal department. Alaska Constitutional Convention Proceedings at 2034, 2037, 2246. Therefore, in their mind, the University of Alaska did not fall under section 26 of Article III.

Other delegates, however, remained concerned that in order to insulate the University from politics it needed to be made explicit that the University was not subject to section 26 of Article III. In particular, certain delegates were concerned that if section 26 did apply to the University, that the Board of Regents’ appointment of a president would be subject to approval by the governor. Accordingly, these delegates sought to amend section 26 to state that the provision did not apply to the University of Alaska. Alaska Constitutional Convention Proceedings at 2245-2258. Ultimately, these attempts failed because the members of the Executive Branch committee persuaded the convention that section 26 simply did not apply to the University of Alaska. Alaska Constitutional Convention Proceedings at 2246, 2257. Moreover, several delegates noted that a separate article was being drafted to govern the University of Alaska. *Id.* at 2247-48, 2250, 2255.

During the debate, some delegates expressed observations as to the status of the University. The chair of the Executive Committee, Victor Rivers, stated that the Executive Branch article would have no impact on the University:

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<sup>2</sup> Section 25. Department Heads. The head of each principal department shall be a single executive unless otherwise provided by law. He shall be appointed by the governor, subject to confirmation by a majority of the members of the legislature in joint session, and shall serve at the pleasure of the governor, except as otherwise provided in this article with respect to the secretary of state.

Section 26. Boards and Commissions. When a board or commission is at the head of a principal department or a regulatory or quasi-judicial agency, its members shall be appointed by the governor, subject to confirmation by a majority of the members of the legislature in joint session, and may be removed as provided by law. They shall be citizens of the United States. The board or commission may appoint a principal executive officer when authorized by law, but the appointment shall be subject to the approval of the governor.

Walsh: May I ask a question, Mr. Rivers? I think to clarify in the minds of several people here it might be well for me, that [as] one of those serving on the Board of Regents of the University of Alaska, composed of eight members, and the Board of Regents select the President of the University. The governor, as I understand it, does not have the power of the removal of the president of the University. It is a matter for the Board. Would this situation change that, Mr. Rivers?

Rivers: No, in regard to the University, this would not affect their present setup. They are a private corporation, or rather a nonprofit corporation, and under the specific law providing for their make-up, and you would still have a board of regents appointed by the governor and confirmed by the legislature, and the powers as you now have them would be identical to what they now are as I visualize them.

*Id.* at 2033-34. Delegate Taylor stated that the “University is not a part of the Territorial government whatsoever; it is an independent agency.” *Id.* at 2253. Notably, Delegate Nordale expressed the view that by explicitly putting the University in a separate article it would “make it very clear that it can never be dissolved and that it is not part of the executive branch of government.” *Id.* at 2256.

Later in the convention, the Executive Branch committee proposed language regarding the University. Chair Rivers introduced the language as follows:

Mr. President, you have heard the reading of this article and it was considered important that in the constitution there be included an article of this type. It gives the University, as a corporate body, the authority to receive and hold property which will be granted to them under the enabling act. It also gives them the authority for administering and disposing of that according to law. It sets up the board of regents and the governing body of the University, and I think the main point of this article has is that constitutionally the University of Alaska shall be the only state university in Alaska.

*Id.* at 2792. Perhaps notably, the Executive Branch committee saw fit to clear the language of the proposed article with the President of the University prior to bringing it to the floor of the convention.<sup>3</sup> *Id.*

## II. Analysis

With this summary of the constitutional history of the University in mind, we think it is fair to draw the following conclusions. First, the convention intended to create a very strong governor with full appointive power. Second, despite the strong governor model, the convention nevertheless intended to insulate the University from politics, including the governor. Third, the convention intended that the University would not be subject to section 26 of Article III of the Alaska Constitution. Fourth, the convention intended to constitutionalize the existence of the University. Finally, some members of the convention believed that the University resided outside the executive branch of government in 1955 and that the constitution preserved that status.<sup>4</sup>

Nowhere in the convention minutes is there any discussion regarding removal of a regent.<sup>5</sup> But the above conclusions are sufficient to give us pause that the governor's power to remove certain executive branch appointees without cause extends to the University Board of Regents. This view is consistent with the views previously expressed by this office. In 1979, we opined:

Under the state constitution, the University of Alaska is 'governed' by the Board of Regents. Alaska Const., art. VII, § 3. The regents are appointed by the governor, subject to confirmation by the legislature. *Id.* They serve for terms of eight years. Thus, while the regents are appointed by and are responsible to the governor, they do not serve at his pleasure but rather for fixed terms, and they may, therefore, be

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<sup>3</sup> In other words, it is doubtful that President Patty, the University president at the time, would have approved this language if he thought it allowed the governor to remove a regent without cause.

<sup>4</sup> By observing this latter point, we do not conclude that in fact the convention succeeded in fully removing the University from the executive branch.

<sup>5</sup> Though at one point, Chair Rivers states that "[t]he law could provide no doubt for means of removal . . ." *Id.* at 2255-56. He appears to be referring to the chief executive of the University, not the regents, however.

removed from office solely for cause. 67 C.J.S. Officers § 120 (1978); 63 Am. Jur.2d Public Officers and Employees § 189 (1972). As a result, the governor's supervision over the university is made distinctly indirect. Unless the members of the Board of Regents commit acts of malfeasance, misfeasance, or nonfeasance sufficient to constitute cause for their removal, the governor possesses no check upon them and no power to direct their activities.

1979 Inf. Op. Att'y Gen. 1 (Jan. 23; J-66-103-79). We have reiterated this view over the years<sup>6</sup> and see no reason to stray from it today.

For the reasons expressed above, the University is accorded unique constitutional status. We must be mindful of these reasons when considering the applicability of Alaska Supreme Court precedents. A number of these cases have been cited by other counsel, but we doubt that a court would find them controlling on the issue of whether the governor may remove a regent without cause. For instance, *Walker v. Alaska State Mortgage Assoc.*, 416 P.2d 245 (Alaska 1966) does not involve the University of Alaska, but rather pertains to a board of a public corporation that does not have a unique constitutional status. The cases involving the University do not have issues that directly implicate the political independence of the University, one of the reasons for the University's unique constitutional status. See, e.g., *University of Alaska v. Nat'l Aircraft Leasing*, 536 P.2d 121 (Alaska 1975) (University is instrumentality of state for purposes of sovereign immunity); *McGrath v. University of Alaska*, 813 P.2d 1370 (Alaska 1991) (legislature may subject University to Administrative Procedures Act). Instead, we think a court if faced with the issue of whether the governor may remove a regent without cause would be more likely to focus on the constitutional history of the University set forth above.

Finally, legislative counsel contends that under AS 39.05.060(d) regents serve at the pleasure of the governor and may be removed at any time. This interpretation is at odds with the express intention of the constitutional convention that the University be insulated from politics. Moreover, review of the fairly lengthy legislative history of this statute demonstrates that the legislature never intended AS 39.05.060(d) to reach the

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<sup>6</sup> In 1998, an assistant attorney general stated that, "Regents are considered to be sort of in a class by themselves. We've always advised the governor that it's inadvisable to remove the regents at a change of an administration. Legal complications may ensue." 1998 Anchorage Daily News (quoting AAG James Baldwin).

Board of Regents. This statute was originally enacted as part of the State Organization Act of 1959, under which the executive branch of the new State of Alaska was formed. *See* ch. 64, SLA 1959. The University of Alaska is not within the scope of this Act—it was not mentioned in the Act and was left out of the organization of the executive branch accomplished by this Act. *Id.* When initially enacted, AS 39.05.060 only referred to boards that were explicitly mentioned in the State Organization Act of 1959. While the scope of AS 39.05.060 has both expanded and contracted over the years, it has never been broadened to include the Board of Regents.<sup>7</sup>

In summary, we conclude that the Governor may only remove a regent if cause is established, preferably at a hearing prior to removal. We would be happy to address in another memo the evidence necessary to establish cause, and the criteria for an appropriate hearing process.

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<sup>7</sup> We note, however, that it may be possible for the legislature to provide for removal of a regent through enactment of a statute consistent with the constitution. Such a statute would have to preserve the University's politically independent constitutional status and probably could only provide for removal if it were for some cause that was established at a hearing prior to removal.